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that are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a 
metaphysically necessary condition for the possibility of Y,” must be grounded in considerations 
of conceivability and possibility. More explicitly, the Transcendental Premise is based on what 
Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 2) call the “conceivability-possibility (or 
inconceivability-impossibility) move.” This “inconceivability-impossibility” move, however, is a 
problematic argumentative move when advancing transcendental arguments for the following 
reasons. First, from “S cannot conceive of P” it doesn’t necessarily follow that P is 
inconceivable. Second, from “P is inconceivable” it doesn’t necessarily follow that P is 
metaphysically impossible. Third, rather than block skeptical doubts, the conceivability-
possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move introduces skeptical doubts. For these 
reasons, transcendental arguments fail to deliver on their promise to overcome skeptical doubts. 
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1. Introduction 
Stern (2013) identifies the following key features of transcendental arguments: 
(A) Transcendental arguments are anti-skeptical, which is why they must begin from a 
starting point that the skeptic can be expected to accept. 
In other words, “the point of transcendental arguments in general is an anti-skeptical point” 
(Strawson 2008, p. 8).1 
(B) Transcendental arguments involve a transcendental claim, i.e., that X is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of Y, where the necessity and possibility in question are taken 
to be metaphysical, not logical or nomological. 
As Cassam (2007, pp. 54-55) points out, transcendental arguments are ineffective insofar as 
explaining how X is possible is concerned, but only insofar as showing that X is necessary for the 
possibility of Y is concerned. 
As far as (A) is concerned, Stern (2003) writes: 
there are clear dialectical advantages to beginning with something that even the sceptic 
will grant us as a starting point (such as subjective experience), whereas he may question 
the existence of reality conceived of in more objective terms. It is largely for this 
                                                          
1 See also Stroud (1968). 
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dialectical reason, therefore, that contemporary transcendental arguments follow Kant in 
focusing on the necessary conditions of experience, language, belief, intentionality, and 
so on, where the conditioned is something the sceptic himself is prepared to assume at the 
outset (Stern 2003, p. 4). 
That is, to be effective arguments against the skeptic, transcendental arguments must assume as 
premises claims that the skeptic is prepared to accept, such as claims about subjective 
experience. Furthermore: 
[Transcendental arguments] set out to show that something the sceptic takes for granted 
as a possibility (for example, that we have direct access to our inner states but no direct 
access to the external world, or beliefs but no reliable belief-forming methods) must be 
abandoned, as the one is in fact impossible without the other, for reasons he has 
overlooked (for example, that inner states alone cannot provide the basis for time-
determination, or that beliefs by their nature must be generally true) (Stern 2003, p. 4). 
As far as (B) is concerned, Stern (2003) says that: 
[Transcendental] arguments involve a claim of a distinctive form: namely, that one thing 
(X) is a necessary condition for the possibility of something else (Y), so that (it is said) the 
latter cannot obtain without the former. In suggesting that X is a condition for Y in this 
way, this claim is supposed to be metaphysical and a priori, and not merely natural and a 
posteriori: that is, if Y cannot obtain without X, this is not just because certain natural 
laws governing the actual world and discoverable by the empirical sciences make this 
impossible (in the way that, for example, life cannot exist without oxygen), but because 
certain metaphysical constraints that can be established by reflection make X a condition 
for Y in every possible world (for example, existence is a condition for thought, as the 
former is metaphysically required in order to do or be anything at all (Stern 2003, p. 3; 
emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, transcendental arguments have the following logical structure (Stern 2007, p. 144): 
Experience Premise: We have certain experiences Y. 
Transcendental Premise: A metaphysically necessary condition for us having Y is the 
truth of X. 
Conclusion: X.2 
For example, against the external-world skeptic who denies the possibility of knowledge about 
the external world,3 Putnam (1981, pp. 14-15) puts forth an argument that can be reconstructed 
as a transcendental argument as follows (Wright 1992): 
1. I can think that I’m not a BIV. 
2. In order to think that I’m not a BIV it must be the case that I’m not a BIV. 
Therefore, 
3. I’m not a BIV. (Cf. Pritchard and Ranalli 2016.) 
                                                          
2 On whether or not transcendental arguments can be undogmatic, see Kuusela (2008). 
3 For a discussion of external world skepticism, see Greco (2007). 
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Premise (1) in Putnam’s argument is supposed to be a premise that the external-world skeptic is 
prepared to accept, namely, that one can experience the thought I’m not a BIV. Premise (2) in 
Putnam’s argument is supposed to capture a metaphysical constraint on reference, which stems 
from Putnam’s causal theory of reference, according to which reference is partly fixed by context 
and causal history, which is why it is metaphysically impossible, on Putnam’s view, to refer to 
something without being acquainted with it. From premises (1) and (2), then, (3) is supposed to 
follow, since Putnam’s metaphysical constraint on reference doesn’t seem to hold in the case of 
BIVs.4 
Similarly, Descartes’ Cogito argument can be construed as a transcendental argument 
against external-world skepticism as follows: 
1. I can think that I’m thinking. 
2. In order to think that I’m thinking I must exist. 
Therefore, 
3. I exist. 
Again, premise (1) in Descartes’ Cogito argument is supposed to be a premise that the external-
world skeptic is prepared to accept, namely, that one can experience the thought I’m thinking. 
Premise (2) in Descartes’ Cogito argument is supposed to capture a metaphysical constraint on 
thinking, i.e., that it is metaphysically necessary to exist as a thinker in order to think. From 
premises (1) and (2), then, (3) is supposed to follow, since Descartes’ metaphysical constraint on 
thinking does seem to hold in this case.5 
In what follows, I argue that transcendental arguments cannot accomplish both (A) and 
(B) at the same time. More explicitly, I argue that, insofar as they rely on a transcendental 
premise concerning metaphysical possibilities, namely, the Transcendental Premise, 
transcendental arguments cannot be effective anti-skeptical arguments, for they depend on a 
move that introduces rather than blocks skeptical doubts. I will sketch three arguments in support 
of this claim. These arguments will stem from what I take to be the problematic argumentative 
move at the core of transcendental arguments, namely, what Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne 
(2002, p. 2) call the “conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move.”6 
 
2. The conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move 
To see the problem that I think transcendental arguments suffer from, consider the second 
premise of the transcendental argument schema sketched above, according to which “X is a 
metaphysically necessary condition for the possibility of Y.” For this premise to be acceptable to 
the skeptic, as (A) dictates, it must be based on considerations that a skeptic would accept. For 
instance, in the case of Putnam’s argument against the external-world skeptic, the second 
premise, according to which one must be acquainted with BIVs in order to refer to such things, is 
grounded in Putnam’s causal theory of reference. But, surely, the external-world skeptic would 
                                                          
4 For a critique of Putnam’s transcendental argument, see Brueckner (2010, pp. 93-94). See also Pritchard and 
Ranalli (2016) for discussion. 
5 On Descartes’ Cogito argument as a “performative transcendental argument,” see Bardon (2005). 
6 On other objections to transcendental arguments, see Stern 2004, chapter 2. 
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not find Putnam’s theory of reference acceptable at all, since she thinks that there is no way to 
know that there is even an external world to refer to in the first place. So what else could Putnam 
appeal to in order to justify the second premise of his argument in a way that would be 
acceptable to the external-world skeptic? 
As an anonymous reviewer points out, it is important to note that Putnam advances other 
considerations in support of the causal theory of reference. For instance, by invoking the notion 
of “the linguistic division of labour” (Putnam 1975, pp. 227-228), and using examples like the 
one about ‘elm’ and ‘beech’, Putnam argues that we can refer to these trees, which is taken for 
granted, even if we are not experts. As Devitt and Sterelny (1999, p. 88) put it, the “causal theory 
lightens the epistemic burden.”7 So the charge against Putnam’s transcendental argument from 
BIVs cannot be that all inferences ultimately rest on considerations of conceivability and/or 
inconceivability; otherwise, the same charge could be leveled against the external-world skeptic 
as well (as we shall soon see). Rather, the charge against Putnam’s transcendental argument from 
BIVs, from the point of view of the external-world skeptic, is that Putnam’s argument invokes 
the notion of reference, and the notion of reference, in turn, presupposes links (on Putnam’s 
view, causal links) between thought and reality. As Reimer and Michaelson (2016) explain: 
thinking you are a brain in a vat requires causal links to things which, if you were a brain 
in a vat, wouldn’t exist. These are the sorts of causal links between thought and reality 
that would make thinking you are a brain in a vat possible in the first place. So you can’t 
have such thoughts, if those thoughts are true. You can in fact have such thoughts, so 
they must not be true (emphasis added). 
But of course, it is precisely such links between thought and reality (or the external world) that 
the skeptic argues are beyond our ken. In other words, insofar as it invokes Putnam’s causal 
theory of reference, Putnam’s transcendental argument from BIVs presupposes that we are 
connected to the external world through thought, which is precisely what the external-world 
skeptic denies. After all, “How can something inside the head refer to something outside the 
head?” (Devitt 1990, p. 91; Putnam 1981, pp. 1-21) 
Similarly, in the case of Descartes’ Cogito argument, the second premise, according to 
which I must exist in order to think, is grounded in Descartes’ notion of what the “I” is, namely, 
a thinking thing. As Gassendi points out in his objections to Descartes’ Mediations, however, 
Descartes cannot assume that there is a particular thinking subject, a thinker (or, as Descartes 
puts it a “thinking thing”) without begging the question against the skeptic. For, as Fisher (2014) 
explains: 
[The] recognition that one has a set of thoughts does not imply that one is a particular 
thinker or another. Were we to move from the observation that there is thinking occurring 
to the attribution of this thinking to a particular agent, we would simply assume what we 
set out to prove, namely, that there exists a particular person endowed with the capacity 
for thought. 
So what else could Descartes appeal to in order to justify the second premise of his argument in a 
way that would be acceptable to the skeptic? 
                                                          
7 For a more recent discussion of “reference borrowing,” see Devitt (2006, pp. 138-141). 
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Since the second premise of a transcendental argument, like Putnam’s argument from 
reference to BIVs and Descartes’ Cogito argument, is a transcendental claim about metaphysical 
necessities, the only considerations one can appeal to, I submit, are considerations of 
conceivability. After all, even skeptics appeal to considerations of conceivability when they 
argue from skeptical hypotheses, such as the BIV hypothesis. Indeed, it is common practice 
among philosophers to appeal to considerations of conceivability in order to support claims 
about possibility. For example, Chalmers (2010, pp. 142) argues from the conceivability of 
philosophical zombies to the metaphysical possibility of such beings.8 
If this is correct, then, for any transcendental argument, the Transcendental Premise, 
according to which “X is a metaphysically necessary condition for Y,” must be grounded in 
considerations of conceivability, more precisely, that Y is inconceivable without X or that Y is 
conceivable only if X. According to Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 5-6), many 
philosophers hold that “our ability to conceive of a scenario where P obtains is reckoned as 
constituting at least prima-facie reason for supposing that P is metaphysically possible.” The 
notion of metaphysical possibility is taken to be primitive, according to Szabó Gendler and 
Hawthorne (2002, p. 4), and is simply glossed as “how things might have been,” or “how God 
might have made things,” or “the ways it is possible for things to be” (cf. Chalmers 2002, p. 
146). The relevant notion of conceivability here is the one Chalmers calls “primary 
conceivability.” According to Chalmers (2002, p. 157), P “is primarily conceivable (or 
epistemically conceivable) when it is conceivable that [P] is actually the case.” To use Chalmers’ 
(2002, p. 158) example, “‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’ is primarily [i.e., considered as actual] 
positively conceivable.”9 
More importantly, for present purposes, according to Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne 
(2002, p. 2), “from the fact that we are (or are not) able to depict to ourselves a scenario in which 
thus-and-such obtains, we take ourselves to have learned something about whether thus-and-such 
could (or could not) obtain.” They call this the “conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-
impossibility) move.” This move, I submit, is what grounds the Transcendental Premise of a 
transcendental argument. In the case of Putnam’s argument against the external-world skeptic, 
for example, it is supposed to be inconceivable that one can refer to BIVs without being 
aquatinted with such things, and thus that one is not a BIV. Likewise, in the case of Descartes’ 
Cogito argument, it is supposed to be inconceivable that one can think without existing, since 
one is a thinking thing, and thus it is metaphysically impossible for one to be a thinking thing 
without existing. 
If this is correct, then the key question for present purposes is whether or not the 
“conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move” can be deployed 
successfully in order to advance transcendental arguments against skepticism; keeping in mind 
that transcendental arguments are supposed to have features (A) and (B) in order to be successful 
anti-skeptical arguments. I think that the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-
impossibility) move cannot be deployed successfully in this way. I will now discuss in some 
detail three reasons why that is the case. 
2a. “S cannot conceive of P” doesn’t entail “P is inconceivable” 
                                                          
8 See also Chalmers (2002). 
9 Cf. Yablo’s (1993) notion of conceivabilityep. 
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First, there is a distinction to be made between P being (primarily, positively) inconceivable and 
failure to conceive of a scenario where P obtains. Presumably, many pre-nineteenth century 
physicists would have had a hard time conceiving of a world where, were it the actual world, it 
would be true that our universe is a four-dimensional space-time continuum, which is something 
that we now think we can conceive of. The point, then, is that failure to conceive of a scenario 
where P obtains is not the same as P being inconceivable, and hence metaphysically impossible. 
If so, then we need a good reason to think that, if we fail to conceive of a scenario where P 
obtains, then that shows—or is at least a strong reason to believe— that P is indeed 
inconceivable. Even if we do have such a reason, though see Mizrahi and Morrow (2015), this 
means that there is no straightforward entailment between “P is inconceivable” to “P is 
metaphysically impossible,” given that one’s failure to conceive of a scenario where P obtains is 
not conclusive evidence that P is indeed inconceivable, as plenty of other historical examples 
show. 
If this is correct, then the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) 
move cannot ground the Transcendental Premise of a transcendental argument, according to 
which “X is a metaphysically necessary condition for Y,” since the fact that one fails to conceive 
of a possible world in which P obtains is not conclusive evidence that P is indeed inconceivable. 
But this means that Y may not be a metaphysically necessary condition for the truth of X after all. 
For example, Putnam finds it hard to conceive of a world in which one can refer to BIVs without 
being aquatinted with BIVs. As was the case for nineteenth-century physicists, this may simply 
be a failure on Putnam’s part, not a sure sign that referring to BIVs without being acquainted 
with BIVs is inconceivable. 
Similarly, Descartes finds it hard to conceive of a world in which there is thinking 
without a particular thinker. As was the case for nineteenth-century physicists, this may simply 
be a failure on Descartes’ part, not a sure sign that there being thinking without there being a 
particular thinker is inconceivable. 
2b. “P is inconceivable” doesn’t entail “P is metaphysically impossible” 
Second, since we are not creatures of unlimited cognitive abilities, it is reasonable to think that 
there are certain things that we simply cannot conceive of just as there are certain things that are 
conceptually beyond dogs and ants. Perhaps there are extra-terrestrial intelligent beings with 
modal powers that are superior to ours such that they can conceive of many more things than we 
can. If there are such creatures, then they would deem conceivable, and hence metaphysically 
possible, what we deem inconceivable, and hence metaphysically impossible. But this means that 
there is no straightforward entailment between “P is inconceivable” and “P is metaphysically 
impossible,” given that there are some things that we cannot conceive of, on account of our 
limited cognitive capacities, just as there are some things that dogs and ants cannot conceive of. 
If this is correct, then, again, the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-
impossibility) move cannot ground the Transcendental Premise of a transcendental argument, 
since the fact that one fails to conceive of a possible world in which P obtains is not conclusive 
evidence that P is indeed inconceivable. But, again, this means that Y may not be a 
metaphysically necessary condition for the truth of X after all. For example, perhaps extra-
terrestrial intelligent beings with modal powers superior to those of Putnam would be able to 
conceive of a world in which one can refer to BIVs without being aquatinted with BIVs, just as 
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Putnam can conceive of things that ants cannot. Again, this may simply be a limitation on 
Putnam’s part, in virtue of being a creature of limited cognitive abilities, not a sure sign that 
referring to BIVs without being acquainted with BIVs is inconceivable. 
Similarly, perhaps extra-terrestrial intelligent beings with modal powers superior to those 
of Descartes would be able to conceive of a world in which there is thinking without a particular 
thinker, just as Descartes can conceive of things that ants cannot. Again, this may simply be a 
limitation on Descartes’ part, in virtue of being a creature of limited cognitive abilities, not a sure 
sign that there being thinking without there being a particular thinker is inconceivable. 
2c. The floodgates of skeptical doubts 
Third, rather than block skeptical doubts, which is what transcendental arguments are supposed 
to do, as (A) dictates, the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move 
opens the floodgates of skeptical doubts. That is to say, it allows the skeptic to raise skeptical 
doubts that transcendental arguments were meant to overcome. I will mention two kinds of 
skeptical doubt that the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move 
allows the skeptic to raise: global skeptical doubts and local skeptical doubts.10 
As far as global skeptical doubts are concerned, the conceivability-possibility (or 
inconceivability-impossibility) move allows the skeptic to argue from skeptical hypotheses. 
Indeed, the familiar skeptical arguments from skeptical hypotheses, such as the deceiving demon 
(Schaffer 2010), dreaming (Brown 2009), and the BIV hypotheses, proceed on the assumption 
that such skeptical hypotheses are conceivable. That is to say, one can conceive of a world in 
which one is a handless brain in a vat and that this world is the actual world. 
According to Greco (2007, p. 625), arguments for external-world skepticism from 
skeptical hypotheses generally proceed as follows: 
SA 
Let o be some ordinary proposition about the external world, such as that I have two 
hands, and let h be a proposition describing some skeptical hypothesis, such as that I am a 
handless brain in a vat. 
1. I know that o only if I know that ¬h. 
2. But I don’t know that ¬h. 
Therefore, 
3. I don’t know that o. 
The conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move, then, allows the skeptic 
to ground the first premise of SA in considerations of conceivability. That is to say, as long as it 
is conceivable that one is a handless brain in a vat (or that one is being deceived by a malicious 
demon), premise (1) of SA holds, and the skeptic can then conclude that one does not know the 
truth of any ordinary proposition about the external world. 
                                                          
10 On global and local skepticism, see Maitzen (2006). Maitzen argues that local skepticism cannot stay local. But 
his argument proceeds from the case of ethical skepticism (or nihilism) alone. 
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As far as local skeptical doubts are concerned, the conceivability-possibility (or 
inconceivability-impossibility) move allows the skeptic to raise specific doubts about scientific 
claims to knowledge. For example, “the generally accepted big bang theory holds that the 
observable universe emerged from an explosion some ten to twenty billion years ago [and 
nonetheless] that all the matter in the universe was present from the start” (Guth 1997, p. 2). But 
how can that be? After all, “Nothing can be created from nothing” (Guth 1997, p. 2). That 
something can come from nothing seems inconceivable. If it is, then the skeptic can argue as 
follows: 
1. It is inconceivable that the universe came into existence from nothing. 
2. If it is inconceivable that P, then it is impossible that P. 
Therefore, 
3. It is impossible that the universe came into existence from nothing. 
Now, whatever is impossible cannot be actual. So, from (3), it follows that it is not the case that 
our universe came into existence from nothing. And that, in turn, means that the Big Band model 
is incorrect, since it “assigns a finite age to the universe” (Guth 1997, p. 335), and thus a moment 
in which the universe was created from nothing.11 
Accordingly, the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move gives 
the skeptic a tool for raising local doubts about scientific claims to knowledge. Here is another 
example. According to “the best theory we have of nature [whose] predictions have been verified 
over an immense range of phenomena” (Stenholm 2002, p. 186), namely, Quantum Mechanics, a 
subatomic particle, such as an electron, can be in a superposition of quantum states, e.g., one and 
the same particle can pass through two slits at the same time. But how can that be? That one and 
same particle can pass through two slits at the same time seems inconceivable. If it is, then the 
skeptic can argue as follows: 
1. It is inconceivable that a particle can be in a superposition of quantum states. 
2. If it is inconceivable that P, then it is impossible that P. 
Therefore, 
3. It is impossible that a particle can be in a superposition of quantum states. 
Again, whatever is impossible cannot be actual. So, from (3), it follows that it is not the case that 
a particle can be in a superposition of quantum states. That, in turn, means that quantum 
mechanics is incorrect, since the principle of superposition is a fundamental principle of 
Quantum Mechanics, and it implies that “a particle in one quantum state is also simultaneously 
in other quantum states” (Phillips 2003, p. 52).12 
If we grant the skeptic the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) 
move, then, she can use it to raise global as well as local skeptical doubts. This result, I submit, 
may be particularly problematic for some friends of the move who also turn to science either for 
empirical confirmation of their views or for making their views consistent with the relevant 
science. For instance, Chalmers, who is a key proponent of the conceivability-possibility (or 
inconceivability-impossibility) move, as we have seen, also talks about the “science of 
                                                          
11 See also Albert’s (2012) review of Krauss’ book, A Universe from Nothing (2012), in The New York Times. 
12 For more on superposition, see Albert (1992, pp. 1-16). 
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consciousness” (as opposed to the philosophy of consciousness), thinks that “the prospects for a 
science of consciousness are reasonably bright” (Chalmers 2010, p. 52), appeals to scientific 
evidence (Chalmers 2010, p. 48), and talks about “the world as revealed by contemporary 
science” (Chalmers 2010, xxv). 
If the aforementioned considerations are correct, however, then something’s got to give. 
That is to say, Chalmers cannot appeal to the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-
impossibility) move when theorizing about consciousness (see, for example, his famous zombie 
argument in Chalmers 2010, pp. 141-206) while, at the same time, appealing to scientific 
theories that have inconceivable consequences. Some of our best scientific theories, such as the 
Big Bang model and Quantum Mechanics, tell us things that we find inconceivable, such as the 
universe coming into existence from nothing and particles being in several quantum states 
simultaneously. Anyone who endorses the conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-
impossibility) move, then, would have to conclude that these scientific theories must be 
incorrect, since they have inconceivable consequences. 
At this point, it might be objected that transcendental arguments are supposed to uncover 
problems with skeptical hypotheses such that those hypotheses become impossible. Presumably, 
this is what Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is supposed to do.13 That is, Kant’s Refutation of 
Idealism is supposed to demonstrate the “theorem” that “The mere, but empirically determined, 
consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me” (Kant 
1998, p. 327; B 275). In the Critique of Pure Reason (B 275-276), Kant writes: 
I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination 
presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be 
something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through 
this persistent thing. [According to the revised preface (B xxxix), this sentence is to be 
replaced by the following: “This persistent thing, however, cannot be an intuition in me. 
For all grounds of determination of my existence that can be encountered in me are 
representations, and as such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, 
in relation to which their change, thus my existence in the time in which they change, can 
be determined.”] Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a 
thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. 
Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the 
existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself (Kant 1998, p. 327). 
Since the aim of this paper is to assess whether or not transcendental arguments succeed in 
overcoming skeptical doubts, rather than engage in Kant scholarship, I will use for the sake of 
the present discussion a reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism that many Kant scholars 
seem to find satisfactory. This reconstruction is offered by Dicker (2004, pp. 194-211): 
(1``) I seem to be able to correctly determine the order in time of experiences of mine that 
did not (a) occur within a specious present, and that do not (b) belong to a remembered 
sequence of continuous experiences or (c) include a recollection of the sequence of all the 
earlier experiences within each of the later ones (original emphasis). 
                                                          
13 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
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(2``) When I remember two or more past experiences that are not of type (a)-(c), my 
recollection of those experiences does not itself reveal the order in which they seem to me 
to have occurred (emphasis added). 
(3``) If (2``), then I cannot correctly determine the order in which two or more past 
experiences of mine that are not of type (a)-(c) seem to me to have occurred just by 
recollecting them (emphasis added). 
(4``) I cannot correctly determine the order in which two or more past experiences of 
mine that are not of type (a)-(c) seem to me to have occurred just by recollecting them. 
[from (2``) and (3``)] 
(5``) If I cannot correctly determine the order in which two or more past experiences of 
mine that are not of type (a)-(c) seem to me to have occurred just by recollecting them, 
then I can seem to be able to correctly determine the order in time of two or more past 
experiences of mine that are not of type (a)-(c) only if I conceive some of my experiences 
as being caused by successive objective states of affairs that I perceive (emphasis added). 
(6``) I can seem to be able to correctly determine the order in time of two or more past 
experiences of mine that are not of type (a)-(c) only if I conceive some of my experiences 
as being caused by successive objective states of affairs that I perceive. [from (4``) and 
(5``)] 
(7``) I conceive some of my experiences as being caused by successive objective states of 
affairs that I perceive. [from (1``) and (6``)]14 
As Dicker (2008, p. 105) points out, (7``) seems rather disappointing, “for it fails to say that I 
must conceive of my experiences as being caused by successive objective states of affairs that I 
perceive” (original emphasis). Dicker goes on to say that Kant’s Refutation of Idealism does 
succeed in showing that “even if one is skeptical about knowledge of the order of one’s own past 
experiences, as long as it is granted that one at least seems to be able to assign a determinate 
order to them, one must conceive of them as experiences of an objective world” (emphasis 
added). 
The Transcendental Premise in Dicker’s reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism 
is premise (6``). For this premise to be acceptable to the skeptic, as (A) dictates, it must be based 
on considerations that the skeptic would accept. Note, however, that, as stated, Kant’s Refutation 
of Idealism concerns what one seems to be able to do and what one’s experiences are like. 
Surely, these are premises that are not acceptable to the skeptic. After all, skeptical hypotheses, 
such as BIV, are supposed to illustrate how “objective states of affairs” can be radically different 
from the way they seem or appear to us. Given this “distinction between ‘appearance’ and 
‘reality’, between what things seem to be and what they are” (Russell 1912, p. 12), the skeptic 
can argue that there can be no knowledge about the external world because such “knowledge 
requires good inferences [from how things appear to how things are]” (Greco 2000, p. 104). 
Since “there is no good inference from how things appear to how things are” (Greco 2000, p. 
86), it follows that there can be no knowledge of the external world. Similarly, Mizrahi (2015, p. 
6) shows that the skeptic could argue as follows: for S to know that p, where p is a proposition 
                                                          
14 Cf. Allison (2004, p. 275-304), Stern (2008, pp. 272-273), and Pereboom (2014). 
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about the external world, such as ‘I have hands’, S must be able to distinguish between it being 
the case that p and it appearing to S as if p. Since S cannot distinguish the two, it follows that S 
doesn’t know that p. Given the appearance/reality distinction, then, all that Kant’s argument 
succeeds in showing is what our appearances are like, not what reality is like. So, rather than 
presuppose some link between appearances and reality, which the skeptic would not accept, what 
else could Kant appeal to in order to justify the Transcendental Premise of his Refutation of 
Idealism, namely, premise (6``) in Dicker’s reconstruction, in a way that would be acceptable to 
the skeptic? 
Insofar as Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is a transcendental argument, the Transcendental 
Premise of this argument, namely, (6``), must be grounded in considerations of conceivability 
and possibility, as I have argued above. In other words, it must be based on the conceivability-
possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move. As I have argued above, however, the 
conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move cannot ground the 
Transcendental Premise of a transcendental argument, according to which “X is a metaphysically 
necessary condition for Y,” since the fact that one fails to conceive of a possible world in which 
P obtains is not conclusive evidence that P is indeed inconceivable. But this means that Y may 
not be a metaphysically necessary condition for the truth of X after all. In the case of Kant’s 
Refutation of Idealism, Kant might find it hard to conceive of a world in which one can have 
self-conscious experiences without there being physical objects outside of one’s mind 
(Brueckner 2010, p. 11). But this may simply be a failure on Kant’s part, not a sure sign that self-
conscious experience without physical objects is inconceivable. Indeed, a skeptical hypothesis, 
such as The Matrix, is supposed to be a scenario in which one can have self-conscious 
experiences of objects that do not exist. For instance, it might seem to one as if one is 
experiencing the flavor of a mouth-watering steak and the taste of red wine, but of course, in a 
computer simulation like The Matrix, there are not steaks and there is no red wine. 
I take Brueckner (2010, p. 11) to be raising somewhat similar concerns about Kant’s 
Refutation of Idealism when he, too, says that the argument is “disappointing.” Even “a 
successful Kantian transcendental argument,” Brueckner (2010, p. 11) argues, “would not certify 
any of one’s claims to know facts about particular physical objects.” For, if one were a BIV, one 
would be in a scenario in which one could be caused to experience event A before event B, but 
also be caused to experience event B before event A. So, although one would experience either A 
before B or B before A, one could still end up having false conceptions about the temporal 
sequence of events A and B. Similarly, the Architect of The Matrix could easily make one 
experience events in some order other than the order in which they actually occurred, e.g., the 
experience of tasting a mouth-watering steak before the experience of savoring a glass of red 
wine, and vice versa. 
If this is correct, then Kant’s Refutation of Idealism fails to show that skeptical 
hypotheses, such as BIV and The Matrix, are impossible. For such skeptical hypotheses to be 
impossible, they would have to be inconceivable, since the Transcendental Premise of a 
transcendental argument like Kant’s Refutation of Idealism must be grounded in considerations 
of conceivability and possibility (i.e., the inconceivability-impossibility move) in order to be 
acceptable to the skeptic. Such considerations, however, cannot ground the Transcendental 
Premise because from “S cannot conceive of P” it doesn’t necessarily follow that P is 
inconceivable, and from “P is inconceivable” it doesn’t necessarily follow that P is 
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metaphysically impossible. Indeed, The Matrix is supposed to be a scenario in which one can 
have temporally ordered experiences of objects that do not exist. Moreover, perhaps extra-
terrestrial intelligent beings with modal powers superior to those of Kant would be able to 
conceive of a world in which one can have self-conscious experiences of physical objects that do 
not exist or successive events that do not obtain. Again, this may simply be a limitation on 
Kant’s part, in virtue of being a creature of limited cognitive abilities, not a sure sign that “the 
existence of physical objects is a [necessary] condition for the possibility of self-conscious 
experience” (Brueckner 2010, p. 11). 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that, if transcendental arguments are to proceed from premises that 
are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a 
metaphysically necessary condition for the possibility of Y,” must be grounded in considerations 
of conceivability and possibility. More explicitly, the premise “X is a metaphysically necessary 
condition for the possibility of Y” is based on what Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 2) 
call the “conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move.” This move, 
however, is a problematic argumentative move when advancing transcendental arguments for the 
following reasons. First, from “S cannot conceive of P” it doesn’t necessarily follow that P is 
inconceivable. Second, from “P is inconceivable” it doesn’t necessarily follow that P is 
metaphysically impossible. Third, rather than block skeptical doubts, the conceivability-
possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move opens the floodgates of skeptical doubts. It 
allows that skeptic to raise local doubts about our scientific knowledge as well as global doubts 
about our knowledge of the external world. For these reasons, transcendental arguments fail to 
deliver on their promise of being effective anti-skeptical arguments. 
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